Criminal Enforcement of Illinois\u27 Environmental Protection Laws: Will Criminal Sanctions Enhance or Hinder the State\u27s Goal of a Healthful Environment by Ward, David A.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 1 Article 9 
December 1982 
Criminal Enforcement of Illinois' Environmental Protection Laws: 
Will Criminal Sanctions Enhance or Hinder the State's Goal of a 
Healthful Environment 
David A. Ward 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David A. Ward, Criminal Enforcement of Illinois' Environmental Protection Laws: Will Criminal Sanctions 
Enhance or Hinder the State's Goal of a Healthful Environment , 59 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 287 (1982). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol59/iss1/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ILLINOIS'
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAWS: WILL
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ENHANCE OR
HINDER THE STATE'S GOAL OF
A HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT?
DAVID A. WARD, 1983*
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides: "The public policy of
the State and the duty of each person is to provide and maintain a
healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations."'
To help ensure the attainment of this public policy, the Illinois General
Assembly enacted the Illinois Environmental Protection Act 2 in June,
1970, creating the Environmental Protection Agency 3 and the Pollution
Control Board 4 to enforce the state's land, air, water, and noise pollu-
tion laws.5 Violations of the state's anti-pollution laws carry both civil
remedies in the form of fines or injunctions6 and criminal penalties.7
Until recently, the civil penalties imposed by the Pollution Control
Board, which consisted of fines of up to $10,000 per day of violation,8
were a much more utilized enforcement tool than the misdemeanor
* B.A., Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1973; M.A., Western Illinois University,
1975; J.D., lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1983.
1. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § I.
2. 1970 I11. Law 76-2429, codified as amended at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l-1/, §§ 1001-1051
(1981) [hereinafter referred to as "Ill. EPA Act" or "the Act"].
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-12, § 1004 (1981). The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
is hereinafter called the I11. EPA.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1ll-1A, § 1005 (1981).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. II I- , §§ 1008-1028 (1981).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llI-1A, §§ 1042, 1043 (1981).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1 l-1A, § 1044 (1981). Whether a particular statutorily defined pen-
alty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248-50 (1980). The inquiry in this regard proceeds on two levels. First, it must be determined
whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated a preference for one
label or the other. Second, where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil
penalty, it must further be determined whether the statutory sanctions are so punitive as to trans-
form what was intended to be a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Id. One important consider-
ation is whether the legislature imposed both criminal and civil sanctions in respect to the same
act. Id Where the same act carries both civil and criminal penalties with the civil penalties being
in the form of fines paid into a remedial fund, and the criminal penalties being imposed in a
separate section of the act, the purported civil penalties are likely to be construed in fact as civil
penalties even though they tend to be punitive in certain respects. 1d. Thus, since the penalties
contained in the Illinois EPA Act are designated by different statutory sections, and since the civil
penalties are deposited into various remedial funds, it is likely that such characterizations by the
Illinois General Assembly are sufficient to separate the two types of penalties.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. II-1A, § 1042(a) (1981).
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penalties provided as criminal sanctions. 9 Between 1970 and 1980,
over 3,700 orders have been issued by the Pollution Control Board,'0
some of which contained civil fines of up to $50,000."1 Recently, how-
ever, enforcement attitudes have begun to shift as national attention
begins to focus on the control of hazardous wastes. 12 Discovery in 1978
of hazardous waste contamination at the Love Canal area of Niagara
Falls, New York, precipitated a national surge of investigation and
publicity about hazardous waste disposal.' 3 Since then, thousands of
disposal sites have been identified and an inestimable number of hid-
den and illegal sites are presumed by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency to exist.'
4
The recognition of the widespread existence of hazardous waste
disposal sites and the developing connection between toxic wastes and
serious health problems have prompted an escalation of enforcement
efforts in the hazardous waste area.' 5 At the same time, the magnitude
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. !111- , § 1044(a) (1981). Before a 1981 amendment the Act only
provided that it shall be a Class A misdemeanor to violate the Act. A misdemeanor in Illinois is
defined as "any offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in other than a peniten-
tiary for less than one year may be imposed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-11 (1979). Misdemean-
ors in Illinois are classified, for the purpose of sentencing into Class A, Class B and Class C
violations, with Class A being the most severe. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1(c) (1981). Fac-
tors in aggravation and mitigation are considered at sentencing in setting the specific term of
imprisonment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1 & 3.2 (1981). To date, no cases resulting in
criminal convictions have been located by the author. The 1981 amendment, which is discussed in
note 45 infra and accompanying text, now provides that "knowing" waste dumping is a felony.
10. POLLUTION CONROL BD. TENTH YEAR ANN. REP. 23 [1980].
!1. Id at 19-22.
12. "Hazardous wastes" are defined as substances that can corrode standard materials or are
so toxic that they pose substantial danger to human life and environment. EPA Characteristics for
Identifying Hazardous Wastes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3, 261.20-.24 (1981); or, in Illinois as substances
which cause or contribute to an increase in mortality or serious illness, or pose a substantial pres-
ent or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored,
transported, disposed of or managed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 11-12, § 1003(g) (1981).
13. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at I, col. 1. After the first story was printed dozens of
articles followed describing the Love Canal situation and publicizing hazardous waste disposal
sites across the country. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1978, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1978,
at 24, col. 3; Id, § 4, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1978, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1978,
§ B, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1978, § B, at 3, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1979, at 12, ol. 1;
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at 12, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1979, at 36, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan.
6, 1980, § 23, at 18, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 23, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1980, at 1,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1980, at 14, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1980, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1981, at 26, col. I; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1981, B 2, at
1, col. 5.
14. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) estimates that there are
over 50,000 hazardous waste disposal sites throughout the country which have the potential of
posing environmental and health problems. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1979, at 36, col. I. The U.S.
EPA also estimates that 20 different industries operating 750,000 industrial plants generate 57
million tons of waste annually. Parisi, Who Pays? Cleaning Up the Love Canals, N.Y. Times,
June 8, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
15. See the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV
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of the costs associated with the clean-up of unlawful hazardous waste
disposal sites is being realized. The United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency places the clean-up costs at more than $44 billion, 6-an
amount most likely beyond current public resources. As a result of the
realization of the serious dangers to health and the environment
presented by hazardous wastes and the tremendously high costs associ-
ated with the clean-up of improperly disposed hazardous wastes, envi-
ronmental enforcement officials have recently indicated a desire to
proceed in certain cases criminally rather than civilly.'
7
Illinois, too, has begun to focus on the problems created by the
generation and disposal of hazardous wastes. In 1980, for example, Il-
linois generated approximately 44 million gallons of liquid hazardous
wastes and over 340,000 cubic yards of solid hazardous wastes-rank-
ing Illinois second in the country in the generation of hazardous waste
material.' 8 Perhaps the most widely publicized Illinois case involved
the Earthline Corporation's hazardous waste disposal site at Wil-
sonville, Illinois, an area of the state which had been heavily coal
mined in earlier years. 19 The dispute began in April, 1977, after resi-
dents of the small village northeast of St. Louis learned of planned
shipments to the site of earth from Missouri contaminated with
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), a fire retardant and carcinogen.
20
Earthline was licensed to receive such hazardous wastes 21 and disposed
of numerous shipments before being ordered to close in August, 1978
by an Illinois circuit court which determined that the site constituted a
1980). These acts attempt to respond to the national health problem presented by hazardous
wastes. For example, the National Cancer Institute estimates that between 60 and 90 percent of
the cancer suffered by United States citizens is caused by environmental contaminants. 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4491, 4494.
16. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1979, at 36, col. 1.
17. See, e.g., Address by James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General of the Land and
Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice, Criminal Enforcement of the Pollution
Control Laws, reprinted in ABA COMMITT-rEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Environmental Enforce-
ment 25 (1978), wherein Assistant Attorney General Moorman stated:
I am a believer in the pollution control laws, their integrity and their vindication. I
believe that they can control anti-social behavior. If properly enforced they will be both
a sword and a shield. A shield to protect society; a sword to chasten those who would
bring misery upon society. I want all to know, and none to doubt, that the Department
of Justice intends to enforce those laws through criminal prosecution.
Id at 28.
18. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMM'N, LANDFILLING OF SPECIAL AND HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS].
19. See HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, at 172-203. See also State Journal-
Register (Springfield), Mar. 10, 1982, at i, col. I; State Journal-Register (Springfield), Feb. 28,
1982, at 5, col. 1; Alton Telegraph, Mar. 5, 1982, at 2, col. 1; Bukrow, Leaking Buried Toxic Wastes
Stir Lawsuits in Illinois, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1982, at 4, col. I.
20. HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, at 173 & 181.
21. Id at 174.
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public nuisance.22 In May, 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the decision in Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc. 23 stating that
the placement of a disposal site above a shaft or tunneled mine was
unlawful.24 Earthline Corporation recently agreed to drop its appeal to
the United States Supreme Court when it was learned that chemicals
had migrated off-site by underground seepage-a distance of about 250
feet.25 Clean-up costs at Wilsonville are estimated at $ 10 million to $20
million.2
6
Another publicized example of a hazardous waste violation oc-
curred recently in Du Page County on a forest preserve. The violation
involved White's Septic Tank Cleaning Service of Bartlett, Illinois.27
As early as 1975, the Illinois EPA file on White disclosed dumping vio-
lations. White, whose firm was registered with Illinois EPA for the dis-
posal of septic wastes, was suspected of dumping other liquid wastes on
his farm in areas near the west branch of the Du Page River.28 White's
1976 permit listed several warnings against the disposal of industrial or
commercial wastes. 29 Later inspections also revealed "unpermitted li-
quids" on White's property.30
On July 14, 1978, White requested that the Illinois EPA inspect his
property. Field workers from the agency found the property in "excel-
lent condition and in general compliance."'3' This condition did not last
long, however. Two weeks later, state officials again investigated the
property and found that a "paint-like waste had been dumped indis-
criminately" on the property near the Du Page River. 32 In later testi-
mony before the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, Mrs.
White admitted that her husband had supplemented the business by
22. Id The circuit court also ordered the contaminated wastes to be exhumed for shipment
elsewhere.
23. 86 Ill. 2d 1; 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
24. Id at 18; 426 N.E.2d at 832. The General Assembly amended the Act after the inception
of the Wilsonville suit to prevent the placement of a hazardous waste disposal site above a shaft or
mine. Id Earthline Corporation is owned by SCA Services, Inc. HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLI-
NOIS, supra note 18, at 175.
25. See State Journal-Register (Springfield), Mar. 10, 1982, at 1, col. I; Alton Telegraph,
Mar. 5, 1982, at 2, col. 1; Belleville News Democrat, Feb. 21, 1982, at 4, col. I. Experts for
Earthline had testified that the chemicals would not migrate offsite within 500 years. Belleville
News Democrat, Feb. 21, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
26. See State Journal-Register (Springfield), Mar. 10, 1982, at I, col. I.
27. See HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, at 131-37.
28. Id at 131.
29. Id at 131-32.




hauling industrial wastes. 33
The Du Page County Forest Preserve District later acquired part
of White's property and recently unearthed forty barrels of toxic wastes
on the land.34 Investigators from the Illinois Department of Law En-
forcement and the Illinois Attorney General's Office investigated the
incident.35 A civil suit filed by the Attorney General's Office against
White is currently pending.
36
A third recent example of a hazardous waste violation involved
the King-Seeley Thermos Company and its plant engineer, Keith
Kohn, near Freeport, Illinois in Stephenson County.37 A five-count
civil suit filed by the Illinois Attorney General claims that Kohn and
the company were responsible for dumping more than 300 barrels of
flammable and toxic substances on Kohn's 100-acre farm. An investi-
gation by the sheriff's department uncovered the barrels dumped in
various sites on the farm including a culvert within 100 feet of the Pe-
catonica River. 38 The barrels, many of which were overturned and
leaking, contained such toxic solvents as toluene, benzine, biphenyls,
lead and chromium.39 The dumping, for which Kohn received pay-
ment by King-Seeley is believed to have occurred for several years.40
The Illinois Attorney General's civil suits against Kohn and King-See-
ley are currently pending.
41
Illinois lawmakers, cognizant of the high costs and dangers posed
by hazardous wastes, 42 recently increased the civil and criminal penal-
33. Id at 133. Mr. White was not able to testify due to a developing poor health condition
which necessitated hospitalization. Mr. White had also begun to develop a difficulty in remem-
bering facts. Id
34. Id at 203.
35. Id
36. Interview with Morton Friedman, Special Assistant Attorney General, in Chicago
(March 22, 1982). Future references to this case will be made as "White Septic."




41. Interview with Morton Friedman, Special Assistant Attorney General, in Chicago
(March 22, 1982). Future references to this case will be made as the"King-Seeley" case.
42. Other recent cases or discoveries of hazardous waste violations in Illinois include:
(1) Outboard Marine Corp. in Waukegan was found to have dumped large quantities of PCB's in
Waukegan Harbor (Lake Michigan). Cleanup costs are estimated at $17 million. Bukrow, Leak-
ing Buried Toxic Waste Stir Lawsuits in Illinois, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1982, at 4, col. 1;
(2) The Johns Manville Corporation reportedly has asbestos wastes piled on the Lake Michigan
shoreline and another site in Lake County where a closed landfill is allegedly leaking chemicals.
Waukegan News Sun, Mar. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 3; (3) The U.S. Ecology Corporation's nuclear waste
landfill near Sheffield, Illinois is suspected of leaking radioactive tritium and other hazardous
wastes from the disposal site. See HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, at 157-172;
Peoria Journal-Star, Mar. 10, 1982, § B, at 10, col. 1; (4) Monsanto Corporation's landfill near
Sauget, Illinois, along the Mississippi River near St. Louis is suspected of leaking PCB's and
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ties imposed under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.43 The
civil penalties for conducting any hazardous waste production, storage,
transportation or disposal operations in violation of the Act have been
increased to a maximum of $25,000 per day of violation. 44 The crimi-
nal penalties also have been dramatically increased under the new Act.
The severest of the new penalty provisions provides for the imposition
of a Class 3 felony and a criminal fine of up to $1,000,000.
4 5
PROBLEMS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
The escalation of penalties for unlawful dumping of hazardous
wastes indicates that the government desires to deal aggressively and
sternly with hazardous waste violators.46 However, the use of the crim-
inal system as an enforcement tool in the environmental context will
likely result in many unique problems for law enforcement, environ-
mental, and public health officials. First, the use of the criminal system
will result in heightened constitutional protections afforded to sus-
pected violators as compared to a system which relies primarily upon
civil penalties as an enforcement tool. Government officials from the
state environmental protection agency, department of public health,
dioxins, highly toxic substances suspected to cause serious genetic defects. Belleville News Demo-
crat, Feb. 26, 1981, § A, at I, col. 1; St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 24, 1982, at 4, col. 1. Illinois
officials have compiled a list of 28 known hazardous chemical dumps throughout the state. Chi-
cago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
43. See Environmental Protection Act, Pub. Act No. 82-380, 1981 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1699
(West) (codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I111- , §§ 1003-1044). The amendment to the Act was
effective September 3, 1981.
44. Environmental Protection Act, Pub. Act No. 82-380, 1981 Ill. Legis. Serv. § 42(b)(3), 1722
(West) ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111- , § 1042(b)(3).
45. Environmental Protection Act, Pub. Act No. 82-380, 1981 Ill. Legis. Serv. § 44(c)(2), 1723
(West) ILL. REV. STAT. ch. II I-1h, § 1044(c)(2). A Class 3 felony is imposed upon a person or
organization for the transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste in violation
of the Act when the person or organization knows at the time that he (or it) thereby places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and whose conduct in the circum-
stances manifests in extreme indifference for human life. Id Conduct which manifests an unjus-
tified and inexcusable disregard for human life carries a Class 4 felony penalty and criminal fine
not to exceed $250,000 in the case of a person and $1,000,000 in the case of an organization. Id
The Illinois Criminal Code § 2-7 defines "felony" as an offense for which a sentence to death
or to a term of imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is provided. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 2-7 (1981). The Unified Code of Corrections provides for six classifications of felonies:
Murder, Class X, Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1(b)
(198 1). Factors in aggravation and mitigation are considered at sentencing in setting the specific
term of imprisonment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1 & 3.2 (1981).
46. One additional concern raised by HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, at 79-
80, indicates that there is a very real potential for infiltration by organized crime into the hazard-
ous waste disposal industry due to the high profits in the business. See also Chicago Sun-Times,
Aug. 19, 1981, at 80, col. 2. While there was little evidence of organized crime involvement in
Illinois landfill operations, SCA Services, Inc., owner of the Wilsonville landfill, is reported to
have links to organized crime. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 19, 1981, at 80, col. 2.
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natural resources institute, as well as numerous local health department
officials and sanitary district employees will be in a position for the first
time to have primary responsibility for ensuring that the state acts
within the constitutional limitations placed on it by the United States
and Illinois constitutions.
47
Second, the ability of government officials to rely upon the consent
of citizens whose premises are being inspected, either expressly or im-
pliedly through a licensing provision, may be severely diminished.
Once persons who are the objects of inspections under the environmen-
tal enforcement program become aware of the stiff criminal sanctions
now incorporated into the law, many will most likely deny consent for
such inspections. As a result, officials will need to be prepared to ob-
tain the requisite warrants in order to gain entry to premises for pur-
poses of enforcing the environmental laws.
Similarly, use of certain recognized exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement may not be feasible since unlike fire, floods, natural gas
leaks or other emergencies, most hazardous wastes do not present
themselves in a way to make the danger obvious to the investigator,
agent or citizen. Many substances go undetected for years before the
dangers are known. 48 If laboratory analysis of a substance is required
before the danger becomes known, then a warrant may be required to
gain access to the premises containing the unknown substance if any
evidence so obtained would be used in criminal proceedings.
Last, the factual showing necessary to receive a warrant may be
difficult even for the agent trained in the area of hazardous wastes.
Due to the fact that there are thousands of potentially hazardous waste
substances 49 and seemingly limitless ways for improper disposal, inves-
tigators may be forced to resort to lengthy surveillances in order to get
the requisite facts to support the issuance of a search warrant. In the
meantime, the dumping activities may be posing immediate, though
undetected, health dangers and causing irreparable harm to the
environment.
For purposes of analyzing and discussing these problems, viola-
tions of the Act will be grouped into three classifications: reporting
47. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency has over 800 employees who must now be
very cognizant of the constitutional limitations placed upon them if effective criminal enforcement
of the environmental laws is to be achieved. POLLUTION CONTROL BD. TENTH YEAR ANN. REP.
11980]. Illinois law also provides for county public health departments, ILL. REV. STAT. ch 11 l-/,
§ 20ci (1981), whose officials also consider the environmental health within their purview.
48. See notes 13 & 14 supra, and accompanying text.
49. An estimated 3,000,000 chemical compounds existed in 1976, and an estimated 250,000
new chemicals are created each year. 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4491, 4493.
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violations by those persons or organizations which report to the Illinois
EPA;50 substantive violations by those persons or organizations which
have otherwise properly registered with the Illinois EPA;51 and surrep-
titious dumping violations by persons or organizations, the so-called
"midnight dumpers" who secretly dispose of wastes for a cheaper price
than the industry would pay for safer disposal.52 The criminal penal-
ties have most likely been created to deter violations of the Act's re-
porting requirements and violations by "midnight dumpers" and to
more effectively punish those violators, while the stiffer civil penalties
will most likely continue to be utilized for the substantive violations by
those who have otherwise submitted to the government's regulation.
The Illinois Environmental Protection Act's entry provision states:
The [Illinois Environmental Protection] Agency shall have authority
to enter at all reasonable times upon any private or public property
for the purposes of inspecting and investigating to ascertain possible
violations of the Act or of regulations thereunder, or of permits or
terms or conditions thereof, in accordance with constitutionallimitations.53
In light of the greatly enhanced criminal penalties and the expected
interest in the criminal enforcement of the environmental protection
50. "Reporting violations" as used in this note refers to the situation where a person or or-
ganization registers with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency but intentionally fails to
accurately report to the Agency the quantity or characteristic of the product produced or disposed
of. The White Septic case reported in notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text is an example of a
reporting violation.
51. "Substantive violators" is used to refer to those persons or organizations which have ap-
propriately registered with the Illinois EPA but in some way (either intentionally or inadvertently)
failed to comply with the substantive provisions of the law. The Wilsonville case discussed in
notes 19-26 supra and accompanying text illustrates this type of violation.
52. As used in this note, the term "surreptitious violator" or "midnight dumpers" refers to
those persons who dispose of hazardous wastes outside the legislative registration scheme. The
King-Seeley case discussed in notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text presents an example of a
surreptitious violation. While such violators are usually those who operate totally outside the
government's purview, a reporting violator may also be a surreptitious violator as used herein.
For other examples of midnight dumpers, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at 12, col. 6 and N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1979, at 12, col. I. Culprits range from ignorant and irresponsible persons who
occasionally dump illegally to the operator who systematically evades the law. See, e.g., HAZARD-
OUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS at 69-79.
Costs for proper disposal of hazardous wastes are high. Generators pay as much as $1.35 per
gallon or $155 per drum for proper disposal. HAZARDOUS WASTE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, at
72-73. Thus, one tank truck load of wastes may cost as much as $9,000 to dispose of properly. Id
at 72. Another estimate places proper disposal costs of the types of hazardous wastes found at
Love Canal at $40 per ton. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 1. Therefore, for certain
businesses which have thousands of tons of hazardous wastes to dispose of, "midnight dumping"
could prove to be worth the risk financially. Stiff criminal penalties, however, may result in a
reconsideration of the extent of risk-taking certain individuals are willing to take.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I I - , § 1004(d) (1981) (emphasis added). In addition, the Act pro-
vides for "regular or periodic inspection of actual or potential contaminant or noise sources, of
public water suppliers, and of refuse disposal sites." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111- A, § 1004(c) (1981).
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laws by state and local prosecutors, an analysis of the appropriate con-
stitutional limitations referred to in the Act is appropriate. This note
will compare the constitutional limitations upon government officials
between an environmental enforcement system which relies primarily
upon civil penalties and one which relies heavily upon the criminal
system as a method for enforcement. Principal focus will be on the
fourth amendment search and seizure limitations upon government of-
ficials in the environmental protection area. The note will specifically
address the problem of requiring a warrant in the environmental con-
text and the degree of factual showing required by the enforcement
officer to establish the requisite probable cause. This note will also dis-
cuss certain exceptions to the search warrant requirement and their po-
tential application to environmental enforcement of the hazardous
waste laws. Last, this note will assess the potential impact of the use of
the criminal enforcement system upon the state's ultimate goal of a
healthful environment.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons
or property by the government. 54 The fourth amendment, applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, protects people, not
places, and encompasses an individual's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.55 It is the reasonableness provision of the fourth amendment
which the courts are frequently called upon to rule.56 There is no ques-
tion that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment applies to
searches of individuals or their property when the person is suspected
54. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons, or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Illinois Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches, seizures and in-
vasions of privacy. ILL. CONST. art. I § 6. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that there is no good reason for interpreting the search and seizure provision of the Illinois
Constitution any differently from the fourth amendment. See, e.g., People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140,
258 N.E.2d 341 (1970); People v. Estrada, 68 Ill. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 968 (1979). Therefore, although it is possible that the Illinois courts may choose to extend
greater protection to individuals than afforded by the fourth amendment, Illinois courts currently
interpret the state and federal provisions consistently.
55. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
56. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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of being involved in a crime.5 7 However, the Court has not been so
consistent when the issue was the requirement of a warrant by govern-
ment officials for the purpose of inspections pursuant to legislatively
established regulatory programs. Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court had
ruled that warrantless regulatory inspections of private property by
government agency officials did not violate the fourth amendment
where officials had cause to believe that a regulation was being violated
since such regulatory inspections were considered less hostile intrusions
than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime. 58 But in 1967, in the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal
Court59 and See v. City of Seattle,60 the Court reversed its earlier posi-
tion and held that, with certain exceptions, administrative inspections
61
of private property, either residential or commercial, are unreasonable
if conducted without a valid search warrant and therefore are violative
of the fourth amendment.
62
The extent of the warrant requirement of Camara and See was not
clear for several years63 until the recent decision of Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc. 64 The Marshall v. Barlow's Court, in holding that the statu-
tory authorization for warrantless Occupational Safety and Health Act
inspections of business establishments failed to meet the exception
from fourth amendment requirements, and was therefore unconstitu-
tional, stated:
[Camara and See] held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition
57. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz Court stated that criminal
searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, except in limited circumstances. Id at 357
n.18.
58. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (Upheld warrantless inspections of resi-
dences where city health inspectors have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists since the intrusion
is so minor).
59. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
60. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
61. The term "administrative inspection" is used to refer to government intrusions which
serve some administrative or regulatory purpose and are not aimed at securing evidence of crimi-
nal violations. Administrative inspections need only be supported by administrative probable
cause. See text accompanying notes 92-120 infra for discussion of administrative probable cause.
62. Camara established the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of residential
property, and See established the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of commer-
cial property.
63. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) which held that certain welfare benefits
could be terminated if a recipient refused to permit a warrantless home visit by a government
caseworker. The Wyman decision prompted certain commentators to interpret the Court's opin-
ion as sanctioning warrantless government intrusions when the only applicable penalties are civil
or when the government has conferred a benefit on the citizen. See, e.g., Rothstein & Rothstein,
Administrative Searches and Seizures. What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REV.
341, 379-84 (1975); Note,Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REV. 607, 616-22 (1974).
64. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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against unreasonable searches protects against warrantless intrusions
during civil as well as criminal investigations. [Citations] The rea-
son is found in the "basic purpose of this Amendment. . .[which] is
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials."
'65
Thus, based on Camara, See and Marshall, the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment applies to inspections conducted by officials of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. A warrant is required
for inspections regardless of whether the inspectors are merely pursuing
routine regulatory interests under the statute or whether the true pur-
pose of the inspection is to investigate for purposes of ascertaining a
criminal violation. The probable cause requirements, however, are sig-
nificantly different depending upon the purpose of the intrusion.
Therefore, unless some established exception to the warrant require-
ment is available,66 Illinois environmental and health officials must first
obtain a warrant before entering private property.
THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENTS
Although the fourth amendment's warrant requirement applies to
both administrative inspections and criminal searches, the probable
cause requirement for issuance of a search warrant differs significantly
between the two.67 The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee
that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable
governmental interest.68 Reasonableness is a determination to be made
by a neutral and detached judicial officer, not by a law enforcement
agent or administrative official.6 9 However, the factual showing to es-
tablish probable cause for a criminal search is more particular than the
showing required to show the reasonableness of a routine administra-
tive inspection.
70
Probable Causefor Criminal Searches
The fourth amendment requires that the affidavit in support of a
warrant shall particularly describe the place to be searched and the
65. Id at 312 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
66. See text accompanying notes 121-95 infra.
67. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
68. Id at 539.
69. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 n.3 (1948). The "judicial officer" require-
ment poses no special problem in Illinois since court clerks, attorneys general and sheriffs are not
empowered by Illinois law to issue warrants. The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure limits the
issuance of search warrants to circuit and associate judges. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 102-13, 108-
4 (1981).
70. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
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things to be seized.7' The United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined probable cause for a search to exist where the facts and circum-
stances within the officer's knowledge and received from a reasonably
reliable person are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonably pru-
dent person in the belief that the items to be searched for are connected
with criminal activity and that they will be found in the place
searched.
72
The overriding concern in judging a warrant's specificity as to the
place of the search is the assurance that the government officer will not
have discretion as to the place searched. 73 This aspect of establishing
criminal probable cause in the environmental enforcement context
could require an extensive surveillance of a suspected hazardous waste
disposal site or storage facility before the seeker of the warrant could
establish sufficient facts and circumstances to convince a judge that the
object of the search will be found at the particular place described. A
large building with several floors or rooms, or an area of land with
several buildings, or perhaps even a large fenced area of land could all
pose problems to the agent in establishing the particularity of places
where hazardous wastes are believed will be found. Indeed, many sus-
pected hazardous waste disposal sites are spread over scores of acres
and may be fenced in thereby limiting surveillance to the vehicles en-
tering the site. 74 In addition, the passage of time that may be required
to establish probable cause for a criminal search could have critical
consequences where hazardous wastes are present. Small quantities of
highly toxic substances, once improperly disposed of, may render the
area unsafe for years.75 Indeed, even a short exposure to certain haz-
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Section 108-3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure
provides:
[Ulpon the written complaint of any person under oath or affirmation which states facts
sufficient to show probable cause and whichparticularly describes the place or person, or
both, to be searched and the things to be seized, any judge may issue a search warrant for
the seizure of. . . any instruments, articles or things which have been used in the com-
mission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense in connection with which the
warrant is issued.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1981) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); People v. Francisco, 44 Ill. 2d
373, 255 N.E.2d 413 (1970).
73. See People v. Smith, 20 I11. 2d 345, 169 N.E.2d 777 (1960), wherein the court stated:
A search warrant must contain a description of the premises to be searched so spe-
cifically and accurately as to avoid any unnecessary or unauthorized invasion of the right
of security. It should identify the premises in such a manner as to leave the officer no
doubt and no discretion as to the premises to be searched.
Id at 349, 169 N.E.2d at 780 (citations omitted).
74. See examples cited in note 42 supra.
75. See, e.g., 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6238, 6255-61. For example, in
Havertown, Pennsylvania, a wood preservative company disposed of pentachloraphenal in 1952.
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ardous wastes may cause serious health problems to those persons liv-
ing or working in the area. However, quite unlike most emergency
situations, the danger of hazardous wastes frequently does not present
itself to persons exposed to the wastes since people usually are not
aware of their presence. Thus, the time required to establish the partic-
ularity of the area to be searched under a standard of criminal probable
cause may be counter-productive to the goal of protecting persons from
an unhealthful environment.
76
Perhaps more stringent than particularity as to place is the fourth
amendment requirement as to specificity of items to be seized. 77 In a
situation involving a suspected hazardous waste violation, the requisite
particularity of items to be seized may also present unique constitu-
tional problems. Given the large number of chemical compounds cur-
rently in production and the number of new compounds created every
year,78 it is doubtful that an environmental enforcement agent could
know the particularity of the waste substance prior to investigation.
This investigatory problem is likely more critical for surreptitious
dumping violations or for reporting violations than for violations by
those who have otherwise voluntarily cooperated with the environmen-
tal regulatory effort since those who have registered with the Illinois
EPA are not likely to refuse warrantless admission to their premises for
purpose of inspection. However, the problem of specificity indicates
the uniqueness of establishing probable cause for a criminal search and
seizure in a hazardous waste context. It is unknown whether in fact the
courts will require such a level of particularity in this context. Should a
valid warrant be issued without the traditional level of specificity, an
agent could seize items in plain view79 once legally on the premises.
Illinois courts have indicated a willingness to consider the stage of
the investigation and the circumstances involved in considering the suf-
The chemical has now entered a stream, killing all life in the stream for approximately five miles.
In Perham, Minnesota, arsenic wastes disposed of over 30 years ago continue to contaminate local
drinking water supplies. Id See also notes 19-26 supra and accompanying text regarding the
Wilsonville case. There, hazardous substances have migrated underground outside the site into
water sources.
76. The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure does provide, however, that warrants shall not
be quashed nor evidence suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the substan-
tial rights of the accused. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-14 (1981). This provision will mitigate
non-material irregularities as to the particularity of the place to be searched.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (condemning
general warrants for failing to particularly describe the items to be seized thereby leaving too
much to the discretion of the officer executing the order).
78. An estimated 3,000,000 chemical compounds existed in 1976, and an estimated 250,000
chemicals are created each year. 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4491, 4493.
79. See text accompanying notes 192-95 infra.
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ficiency of the search warrant in the criminal setting. In People ex re.
Carey v. Covelli,80 the Illinois Supreme Court in upholding a warrant
to search a locked desk on the theory that the contents of the desk
would give some clue to a homicide, indicated that a search warrant
issued at an investigatory stage may be less specific than one following
indictment. 8' Illinois courts also have indicated that other circum-
stances may be present which support a flexible standard as to the spec-
ificity requirement. In People v. Wolski 82 an affidavit's failure to
specify with particularity the items to be seized did not invalidate the
pre-arrest search warrant since the affidavit "described the items to be
seized with as much exactitude as was possible at that stage of the in-
vestigation . . . and sufficiently limited the discretion to be exercised
by the officers in conducting the search. '8 3 The courts have stated that
in determining the adequacy of the description of property to be seized,
"we must avoid placing an emphasis upon technical detail at the ex-
pense of common sense. . . . [W]here property of a specified nature,
rather than particular property, is to be seized, a description of its gen-
eral characteristics is sufficient."
8 4
People v. Hane8 5 presents a case on point. In Hanei, the defend-
ant, who was charged with the thallium poisoning of his father, chal-
lenged the specificity of a warrant which did not mention the alleged
crime of thallium poisoning but called for the seizure of items "which
have been used in the commission of, or which constitute evidence of
criminal conduct. '8 6 Specifically, the defendant moved to suppress a
mortar and pestle returned under the warrant which were found to con-
80. 61 111. 2d 394, 336 N.E.2d 759 (1975) (warrant authorized a search of a safe of a deceased
person on the theory that some clue to the homicide might be found within).
8i. The court stated:
Analysis of the existence or nonexistence of probable cause begins with a considera-
tion of the nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought. . . . [Wihat the
constitutions prohibit is not all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreason-
able. [Where] no criminal action pending . . . questions of materiality and relevance
must be tested by a standard which is broader than that which is available when the
issues have been delineated by . . .indictment and plea in a criminal case.
61 111. 2d at 403, 336 N.E.2d at 765 (citations omitted).
82. 83 Ill. App. 3d 17, 403 N.E.2d 528 (1980).
83. Id at 23-24, 403 N.E.2d at 533 (citations omitted).
84. People v. Collins, 69 I11. App.3d 413, 426, 387 N.E.2d 995, 1005 (1979) (Affidavit's refer-
ence to "forged checks," though a legal conclusion rather than a statement of fact, was insufficient
grounds to quash the warrant). See also People v. Raicevich, 61 11. App. 3d 143, 377 N.E.2d 1266,
1270 (1978) ("When circumstances such as presented in this case make an exact description of
items a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic
class of items he is seeking"). Id at 147, 377 N.E.2d at 1270 (citations omitted)).
85. 81 I11. App. 3d 690, 403 N.E.2d 16 (1980).
86. Id at 701, 403 N.E.2d at 25.
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tain traces of thallium. The court, in addressing the particularity of the
warrant, stated:
The degree of particularity required in search warrants varies in de-
gree with the nature of the material to be seized ...
It is understandable that the complaint and affidavits could be
attended by some degree of indefiniteness in enumerating the partic-
ular items to be sought in the search. Thallium is a rare element, and
the means of storing, preparation and delivery for criminal purposes
would be largely unknown to police officers and investigators ...
The officers were obviously not scientifically knowledgable, they did
not have any special training in laboratory techniques, and they had
no idea what thallium looked like. They were as specific in their
listing as the circumstances would allow. .... 87
Therefore, a carefully worded affidavit which otherwise limits the scope
of a requested search at the investigatory stage may survive a constitu-
tional challenge even though the place to be searched and the things to
be seized are not described with particularity as indicated by the fourth
amendment.88
The reasonableness of searches and seizures depends upon a bal-
ance between the public's interest and the individual's right to freedom
from arbitrary interference by law officers.8 9 Given the technical com-
plexity involved in ascertaining whether a substance is a hazardous
waste, and the large number of potential substances involved, a
"broader standard" 90 for the description of items seized in an investiga-
tory search by Illinois EPA officials and other health officials should be
appropriate in the hazardous waste context, even though the purpose of
the search is to look for evidence of criminal activity. Such a standard
should be placed in the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure to ensure
that the public interest is adequately protected from the catastrophic
consequences of improperly disposed hazardous wastes. 9'
Probable Cause for Administrative Inspections
Probable cause for issuance of an administrative search warrant
can be established by a lesser showing of facts than that required for
87. Id at 704-05, 403 N.E.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
88. The statutory grounds for a search warrant also requires particularity as to place to be
searched and as to items to be seized. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1981).
89. See People v. Estrada, 68 Ill. App. 3d 272, 279-80, 386 N.E.2d 128, 131, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 968 (1979) (Upholding systematic and undiscretionary brief stops of automobiles by local
police to check safety equipment and registration in the interest of furthering public safety).
90. See generally People ex rel. Carey v. Covelli, 61 Ill. 2d 394, 403, 336 N.E.2d 759, 765
(1975). See also note 81 and accompanying text supra.
91. Suggested statutory language may be found in text accompanying notes 206-13 infra.
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the issuance of a criminal search warrant. 92 If a valid public interest, as
expressed in the legislative provisions calling for routine periodic in-
spections of private property by government officials, is "reasonable,"
then probable cause exists to issue a suitably restricted search war-
rant.93 Although reasonableness is still a determination to be made by
a neutral and detached judicial officer, as with criminal probable cause,
reasonableness of administrative inspections of private property is
measured by the existence and degree of legislative or administrative
standards as expressed in the statute or regulation.94 Such standards,
which vary with the program being enforced, may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the premises to be searched, or the condi-
tion of the entire area.95 But such standards do not necessarily depend
upon specific knowledge of the place or objects of the search.
96
The Camara Court listed several factors which combine to justify
a lower standard required to establish probable cause for administra-
tive inspection warrants.97 First, administrative inspections have a long
history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public interest is
served by the prevention and abatement of dangerous conditions.
Third, because administrative inspections are neither personal in na-
ture nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime, they involve a
relatively limited invasion of a citizen's privacy.98 Thus, warrants for
92. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (relying upon Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 380 (Douglas, J., dissenting)). It should be noted at this point that the
Illinois warrant statute does not specifically provide for the issuance of administrative inspection
warrants. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1981). However, the provision of the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Act providing for inspections "in accordance with constitutional limitations"
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1004(d) (1981), should be read to mean that the standards set by
Camara for the issuance of administrative inspection warrants should be available to government
officials where appropriate.
93. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
94. Id at 532-39.
95. Id at 538.
96. Id
97. Id at 537.
98. The Camara Court supported its conclusions by quoting both the majority and dissent in
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959):
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places,
either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific prob-
lem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power
that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for
a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city
after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials;
and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few. Certainly,
the nature of our society has not vitiated the need for inspections first thought necessary
158 years ago, nor has experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in meeting
this need by means that history and dominant public opinion have sanctioned.
1d at 372 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted).
This is not to suggest that a health official need show the same kind of proof to a
magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the fruits or instrumen-
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the inspection of private property99 pursuant to statutory or administra-
tive standards may issue despite the absence of probable cause to be-
lieve that a specific violation has occurred.'°° Where the public interest
is great and the statute or regulation calls for periodic inspection sub-
ject to reasonable standards, very little factual showing is required for
issuance of a warrant.'
0'
The third rationale of the Court-that administrative inspections
are not aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime-is puzzling.
Commentators have questioned whether the provision means that the
lower standard is not available when the object of the administrative
inspection is criminal prosecution, or whether the provision means that
the lower standard is available because the administrative inspections
are less intensive than criminal investigations.1 02 The United States
Supreme Court, however, has held to the position that, "[t]he deliberate
use by the Government of an administrative warrantfor thepurpose of
gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the
courts."' 0 3 Therefore, it is clear that where the true purpose of the
"inspection" is to obtain evidence of criminal conduct, a warrant issued
under administrative probable cause standard is insufficient to ensure
adequate fourth amendment protection to the person whose property is
the object of the "inspection". Such "inspection" is a criminal search
in reality and should be supported by criminal probable cause
standards. '04
Recent decisions by California courts have placed the use of ad-
talities of crime. Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that
would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different
from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been
undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities
without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to
the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection
might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The
test of 'probable cause' required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the
nature of the search that is being sought.
Id at 383 (dissenting opinion).
99. The administrative probable cause standard is available for commercial property as well
as residential property. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967).
100. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 538.
101. See United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974) (An affidavit stating that a
liquor establishment had not been inspected within the last twelve months under a federal inspec-
tion program authorizing periodic inspections was sufficient to support a valid administrative in-
spection warrant).
102. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.1 at 188 (1978) wherein the author suggests
that administrative probable cause should be available when the object of the search is criminal
prosecutions. The author notes there is confusion among courts in this area.
103. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960) (emphasis added).
104. For a discussion of sham or bad faith governmental operations, see the text accompany-
ing notes 196-205 infra.
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ministrative inspection warrants in doubt where criminal sanctions are
pervasive in the regulatory scheme. The California Appellate Court
for the Fifth District in Salwasser Mfg. Co. v. Municipal Court 05 held
that in view of the possible penal consequences of the California Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, the fourth amendment requires that
warrants issued for inspections of property under the Act be supported
by criminal probable cause standards. '06 The court specifically rejected
the state's argument that the administrative probable cause standard
should be retained since the Cal/OSHA department seldom initiates
criminal prosecutions for safety violations. 0 7 The court also stated
that to permit entry under an administrative warrant would permit the
government to seize evidence of a criminal violation under the plain
view doctrine 08 thereby legitimizing a criminal search under the guise
of a regulatory search.1°9 Last, the court held that the federal constitu-
tion requires a showing of probable cause to believe that a Cal/OSHA
violation currently exists on the premises to be inspected." I 0
Following California law as enunciated in Salwasser, the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of California in Rush v.
Obledo I I I held that the existence of misdemeanor penalties in the Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Code requires that warrants issued for inspec-
tions of family day care homes be supported by criminal probable
cause.1 2 The court stated:
[11f the state chooses to subject family day care providers to criminal
sanctions, it must also afford them the full panoply of protections
associated with the criminal justice system. Thus, for any inspection
whose purpose is to determine whether or not a violation of the stat-
utes or regulations governing family day care homes is occurring, the
administrative inspection warrant to enter the home must be based
upon [criminal] probable cause. . . .113
The court also indicated, however, that only those inspections which
are not aimed at detecting violations, such as routine licensing inspec-
tions, are permitted under a warrant supported by administrative prob-
105. 94 Cal. App. 3d 223, 156 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1979).
106. Id In addition to civil penalties, Cal/OSHA provides for a misdemeanor penalty of
"imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months or by a fine not exceeding five thou-
sand dollars ($5,000) or by both." Id at 231, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (1979). Compare Cal/OSHA's
penalty provision to Illinois EPA's criminal provisions of up to a Class 3 felony which carries a
minimum one year sentence in the state penitentiary and up to a $1,000,000 fine.
107. Id at 233-34, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
108. See discussion of the Plain View Doctrine, infra.
109. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
110. Id at 235, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
111. 517 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
112. Id at 916-17.
113. Id at 917.
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able cause." 4 Because good faith by the government is impliedly
required, the administrative warrant is insufficient where there is prior
suspicion that a violation is present." 1
5
The California decisions virtually eliminate the problem of evalu-
ating the good faith of the government inspector-where criminal pen-
alties are present, warrants supported by criminal probable cause are
necessary unless the inspection is for a routine license renewal. 16 This
eliminates the problem of determining the subjective intent of the in-
spector that could arise under the Supreme Court's holding in Abel v.
United States"i7 which bars the use of administrative warrants for the
purpose of obtaining evidence in a criminal case." 8 However, should
the California standard be applied by Illinois courts to non-licensing
inspections of hazardous waste or other disposal sites, the goal of a
healthful environment could be significantly thwarted. Indiscriminate
dumping of highly toxic wastes could present an unknown immediate
danger to hundreds or thousands of persons which could last for gener-
ations-plus cause a serious scar to the environment. It is questioned
whether such an extension of greater fourth amendment protections, as
provided by California courts, to inspections of potential hazardous
waste sites would be well-conceived.
It should be remembered that the reasonableness of the govern-
ment's intrusion depends upon a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to freedom from arbitrary interference by law
officers." 9 Thus, where officials of the Illinois EPA are conducting in-
spections of subjects who have registered with the agency, administra-
tive inspection warrants should be sufficient to gain access unless the
true object of the "inspection" is a search for hazardous waste viola-
tions for the purpose of criminal prosecution. However, searches in-
volving premises not already a part of the regulatory scheme would
ostensibly be a search for purposes of obtaining evidence of a statutory
violation since such a search would not likely occur but for some prior
suspicion of illegal conduct. Where such suspicion exists, a criminal
probable cause standard will likely be required to sustain any subse-
quent criminal proceedings. Therefore, it appears that where the gov-
114. Id.
115. Id
116. Clearly a warrant is not required where a legitimate exception to the warrant requirement
is present. See text accompanying notes 121-95 infra.
117. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
118. Id at 226.
119. See People v. Estrada, 68 I. App. 3d 272, 275, 386 N.E.2d 128, 131, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
968 (1979). See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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ernment desires to proceed criminally against suspected hazardous
waste violators, a criminal probable cause standard must be met. But
where the government will proceed civilly against suspected violators of
the state's environmental protection laws, or where the government has
no prior suspicion of a violation, an administrative probable cause
standard-one requiring little factual showing under the statute or reg-
ulations-need only be met. Such standard should result in a much
more readily obtainable warrant, 2 0 and, hopefully, a shorter period of
public exposure to environmental contaminants.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT OF A SEARCH WARRANT FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS
The general rule that searches conducted without prior approval
by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment is subject to a few specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions.' l2 A few of the exceptions recognized by the Supreme
Court will undoubtedly play a significant role in the state's enforce-
ment of the environmental protection laws. However, the burden is
upon the state to show the need for an exception from the warrant
requirement. '
22
The principal classes of exceptions from the warrant requirement
for inspections by Illinois EPA agents are consent, emergency, reduced
expectation of privacy 2 3 and plain view evidence. However, the courts
will assess the facts and circumstances on a case by case basis to deter-
mine if the warrantless entry onto private property was reasonable in
either an administrative or criminal proceeding. 124
120. For a discussion of the availability of criminal procezdings following evidence obtained
by way of an administrative warrant, see the discussion of the "Plain View" exception to the
warrant requirement, discussed in the text accompanying notes 192-95 infra.
121. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 n.18 (1967).
122. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (State was required to show
that the search was within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement).
123. Reduced expectation of privacy is not traditionally considered as an exception to the
warrant requirement. Rather, where a citizen has no reasonable expectation of privacy the Court
has generally held that governmental intrusions are not unreasonable and that the citizen has no
standing to object to the government's search or seizure. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978) (Holding that a defendant may seek to exclude evidence derived from a search or seizure
only if his legitimate expectation of privacy was violated). The examples discussed in this area
indicate that the analysis is not so clearly made by the courts. Id at 164 (White, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (Held that
pollution readings of smoke from a smoke stack was within the "open fields" exception to the
fourth amendment rather than holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy). See
also text accompanying notes 154-91 infra.




Consent is perhaps most frequently employed when inspecting
property under administrative inspection schemes. Most citizens indi-
vidually share the mutual interests of society in preventing and abating
health and safety hazards 25 and therefore freely consent to inspections.
Usually, the citizen does not have any reason to suspect that evidence
of a crime will be discovered during the inspection or that the purpose
of the inspection is to uncover evidence of criminal activity. However,
where evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of
an administrative inspection authorized by consent of the citizen, the
state faces the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely
and voluntarily given.
126
"Voluntariness" of consent to a search is to be determined by the
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the alleged consensual in-
spection. 127 While factors such as age, intelligence and prior exper-
iences of the citizen consenting to the inspection are considered,
perhaps the single most important limitation upon the voluntariness
determination is whether consent was actually given or rather whether
the citizen merely acquiesced to an assertion of present authority to
inspect.'
28
It is not necessary that the citizen be told that he or she has the
right to refuse to consent, although, in assessing the totality of the cir-
cumstances, such a warning would strongly support the consent theory
of the state. 129 But, the threat to obtain a warrant unless consent is
given does not vitiate subsequent consent. 30
Thus, it appears that unless consent is given without any assertion
of authority by the inspector, or given after the citizen is informed that
125. See note 98 supra.
126. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.12 (1968); People v. Kincaid, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 975, 979, 367 N.E.2d 456, 459 (1977).
127. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
128. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). "The burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. . . cannot be discharged by showing no more
than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Id at 548-49 (footnote omitted). See also
United States v. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969), where an inspector for the
Food and Drug Administration was permitted to inspect a warehouse of a grocery company after
telling the owner that inspections were required under the law, where in fact they were not. The
court held that the circumstances indicated that consent was not freely and voluntarily given.
129. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973).
130. See People v. Magby, 37 11. 2d 197, 226 N.E.2d 33 (1967); People v. Griffin, 53 IU. App.
3d 294, 368 N.E.2d 738 (1977). In Griffn, the court interpreted the threat as containing an implicit
warning that the suspect could withhold consent. Id at 297, 368 N.E.2d at 741.
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consent may be withheld, the EPA inspector should first obtain an ad-
ministrative warrant to inspect the premises. Consent may be less fre-
quently given under the current regulatory scheme because of the harsh
criminal penalties and therefore the inspector should be prepared to
obtain the administrative warrant more frequently. Also, given the
harsh criminal penalties, courts may become less willing to accept the
argument that consent was freely and voluntarily given by a citizen
facing criminal charges. Thus, an administrative warrant should be ob-
tained in addition to requesting consent if it is possible that violations
will be discovered. However, acquiring a warrant for the inspection of
property under an administrative inspection scheme when the true pur-
pose of the inspection is to search for evidence of a criminal violation
raises questions of sham which will be discussed further under the sec-
tion entitled Evasion of the Fourth Amendment.'
13
Implied Consent
Certain types of businesses, by the very nature of their activity,
may be subject to warrantless inspections. 32 A recent United States
Supreme Court decision has given the most definitive statement yet on
when warrantless inspections are reasonable without consent or some
other exception. 33 In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court, in upholding the
standards for warrantless entry onto mining operations by inspectors,
set the following standards for warrantless inspections of private
property:
(1) Property must be commercial;
(2) Warrantless inspections must be authorized by legislation;
(3) Legislation must provide for regularity of inspections and clar-
ity as to their purpose; and
(4) Legislation must indicate that the hazards associated with the
activity are so inherently dangerous that pervasive regulation of
the business is necessary to such an extent that the expectation
of privacy is diminished.134
The Court concluded that the warrantless inspection scheme pro-
vided by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 35 met the
131. See text accompanying notes 196-205 infra.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (Warrantless inspections of gun
dealer's premises authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968 are not violative of the fourth
amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (Congress may au-
thorize warrantless inspections of establishments in the liquor industry).
133. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (Upheld warrantless inspection program of
mine operations by federal mine inspectors).
134. Id at 598-602.
135. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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newly announced standards. The entry section calls for "frequent in-
spections and investigations" each year for the purpose of gathering
data concerning accidents and health standards, and for the purpose of
determining whether imminent danger exists and whether there is com-
pliance with the health or safety standards of the Act.136 The inspec-
tions for hazards and compliance must be made at least four times per
year. 137 It is also important to note that the Act contains both civil and
criminal penalties.1 38 The Court also indicated that new and emerging
industries, such as the nuclear power industry, could be subject to war-
rantless searches given proper legislative declarations and guidelines
for such inspection programs.
39
The Court's holding raises the question of whether the Illinois
EPA Act is sufficient to authorize warrantless inspections. The Act's
entry provisions state:
The [Environmental Protection] Agency shall have authority to enter
at all reasonable times upon any private or public property for the
purpose of inspecting and investigating to ascertain possible viola-
tions of the Act or of regulations thereunder, or of permits or terms
or conditions thereof, in accordance with constitutional limitations. 1
40
Placing the Illinois EPA Act's entry provisions against the four legisla-
tive requirements enunciated by the Court in Donovan v. Dewey, it ap-
pears that the Act fails to constitutionally authorize warrantless
inspections of private facilities by Illinois EPA agents. 14' Although it is
not clear from this language whether the Illinois General Assembly in-
tended to authorize warrantless inspections of private facilities, it
should be clear from Donovan v. Dewey that the regulation of hazard-
ous waste disposal sites could be accomplished by way of warrantless
inspections should the legislature so desire. The Court indicated that if
the hazards associated with the particular activity are so inherently
dangerous that pervasive regulation is necessary, the legislature could
properly conclude that "if inspection is to be effective and serve as a
credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are
136. Id
137. Id
138. 30 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 820(d) provides for up to $25,000 fine and/or
up to one year imprisonment for willful violations of the health and safety standards.
139. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11 1-V2, § 1004(d) (1981) (emphasis added). In addition, the Act pro-
vides for "regular or periodic inspection of actual or potential contaminant or noise sources, of
public water supplies, and of refuse disposal sites." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11 l-1/, § 1004(c) (1981).
141. The Act fails to state that the inspections will be conducted at regular intervals (e.g., twice
per year or every month) and that the inspections of commercial property shall be permitted
without prior announcements and without warrants.
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essential." 42
However, the Court also indicated that a warrant is required
whenever commercial property is searched for the purpose of obtaining
contraband or evidence of a crime absent express consent or exigent
circumstances. 43 This statement by the Court apparently limits the
purpose and scope of warrantless inspections. The provision against
authorizing warrantless inspections for the purpose of searching for ev-
idence of a crime indicates that where a suspicion exists prior to entry
that a violation which is sanctioned by criminal penalties will be found,
an appropriate warrant based on criminal probable cause must be ob-
tained unless another valid exception to the warrant requirement is
present. However, since certain violations of the Mine Safety Act also
carry criminal penalties and since the Court approved periodic and
unannounced warrantless inspections of mines, it is clear that criminal
proceedings will not be barred following warrantless inspections where
there is no case pending or no prior suspicion of a violation.
In light of the fact that consent may not be given as freely in the
future, Illinois lawmakers should consider providing for warrantless
entry in certain circumstances. In particular, warrantless entry should
be provided for landfill sites throughout the state, whether or not the
site is approved for hazardous waste disposal, so that the regulatory
scheme serves as a credible deterrent.44
Emergency
State and federal cases have held that the fourth amendment does
not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches
when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of imme-
diate aid.145 Other cases have recognized the importance of prompt
inspections by regulatory agents without warrants in emergency situa-
tions.146 But the scope of the warrantless entry is limited by the extent
of the emergency. 47 Once the area is secure and the situation no
142. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
143. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 598 n.6.
144. Suggested statutory language may be found in RECOMMENDATIONS, Infra.
145. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 n.6-7 (1978) (citing cases); People v.
Connolly, 55 II. 2d 421, 427, 303 N.E.2d 409 (1973).
146. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrantless search permitted by fire person-
nel to determine the cause of a blaze). See also North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (com-
pulsory smallpox vaccination); Campagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902)
(health quarantine).
147. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-95 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,511
(1978).
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longer poses any immediate threat of harm to persons or property,
traditional requirements for search warrants must be followed.1
48
In situations where government officials rely on the emergency ex-
ception, a determination of the reasonableness of the government's ac-
tion will depend upon a weighing of factors including the factual basis
for believing that an emergency exists; 149 the potential for immediate
harm to persons or property;' 50 and the course of action chosen by the
officer. t51
The emergency exception also may be an appropriate exception in
certain environmental cases-in particular hazardous wastes. Where
an agent has a reasonable basis for believing that a health emergency
exists and the potential for harm is immediate, 152 the emergency excep-
tion may be appropriate. However, such a determination in reality
may be difficult to make. Surreptitious hazardous waste disposal may
result in serious harm to persons and the environment but such harm
may or may not be as immediate as the threat posed by fire. Also, the
agent may not know whether the disposed substance indeed presents a
threat sufficient to justify an emergency until the substance is subjected
to laboratory analysis. If that is the case, the basis for believing that an
emergency exists may not be reasonable before such analysis. A deter-
mination of whether the officer's actions were reasonable will be made
on a case by case basis and the emergency exception will not likely be
approved by the court unless the agent making the warrantless entry
can articulate a reasonable basis for believing that the emergency ex-
isted prior to entry.' 53
148. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (search of a crime scene several days
after the crime requires a warrant); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978). In Michigan v.
Tyler, once the origin of the fire was discovered and placed under control, the emergency had
ended. Any subsequent entries for the purpose of obtaining evidence of arson required search
warrants issued under traditional probable cause standards. Id
149. See, e.g., People v. Mitchel, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976)
(articulated the criteria for judging the reasonableness of an emergency intrusion).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 611-12 (D.D.C.), aff'd without opinion,
479 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
151. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
152. See notes 149 and 150 supra and accompanying text.
153. Failure to justify a warrantless entry on some exception basis may result in loss of the
case in both civil and criminal contexts. See EVASION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT infra and
may even result in the state being liable in tort to the individual for a violation of his or her
constitutional rights. See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background of Tort Liability'" 50 IND.
L.J. 5 (1974).
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Reduced Expectation of Privacy154
In Katz v. United States,'15 the Court held:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.1
56
The Court intended to change the discussion of fourth amendment pro-
tection from that of "constitutionally protected areas" to that of "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy."'' 57 Thus, under a Katz approach, a
warrant may not be required to inspect property where there is little or
no manifestation that an expectation of privacy exists or where the ex-
pectation of privacy is unreasonable. 
58
Open Fields Doctrine
Prior to Katz, the 1924 Supreme Court held in Hester v. United
States159 that fourth amendment protection of " 'persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects, is not extended to the open fields.' ",160 The rule of
Hester has become known as the Open Fields Doctrine. While the
subsequent language of Katz would have appeared to qualify the doc-
trine, the Court inAir Pollution Variance Bd v. Western Alfalfa Corp. 161
followed the Open Fields Doctrine without any discussion of the prin-
ciples enunciated in Katz. 62 Although the Court cited support for the
warrant requirement provisions of Camara and See, the Court held
that in making visual air pollution readings on the property of smoke
from a chimney at a distance of two stack heights away from the plant,
the inspector is "well within the 'open fields' exception to the fourth
amendment approved in Hester."
63
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court will adhere to the
154. See note 123 supra.
155. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
156. Id at 351-52 (citations omitted).
157. Id
158. See, e.g., United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1154 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1030 (1981). See notes 165-69 and accompanying text infra. A warrant also may not be
required where an individual lacks standing to assert a fourth amendment violation. It is assumed
in this note that persons who are the object of a search have the requisite standing. See note 123
supra.
159. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (Jugs of illegal whiskey were seized in a field without a warrant after
being dropped by fleeing individuals).
160. Id at 59.
161. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
162. Id
163. Id at 865 (emphasis added).
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open fields exception to the warrant requirement in appropriate cir-
cumstances. There is, nevertheless, great tension between Katz and the
Open Fields Doctrine since a person may exhibit a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in objects located in open fields. 164 Recent federal and
state court decisions seem to read the two principles together. In United
States v. Ramapuram,'165 the defendant had stashed stolen dynamite in
the trunk of an eleven-year old "junker" located on the defendant's
father's farm several hundred yards from the public road. The farm
was not the residence of defendant or his family and the lock had been
removed from the trunk of the car. Acting on information from an-
other suspect, federal agents proceeded at night, without a warrant, to
the farm and recovered the dynamite from the trunk of the car. 166 The
court held that such intrusion was not justified by exigent circum-
stances, but, nevertheless determined:
[The defendant's] interest in the farm and "junker" was sufficiently
lessened to compel the judgment that he could not legitimately ex-
pect that the contents of the unlocked trunk of the 'junker" situated
in an open field would remain secure from prying eyes, irrespective




The court also noted, "It is sufficient here to observe that whatever ex-
pectation of privacy attends a closed but unsecured 'effect' generally is
diminished where the 'effect' itself is placed in an area totally without
the protection of the fourth amendment such as in an open field."'
' 68
Thus, although the car was not visible to the agents from the public
road, the court, in balancing the defendant's manifestation of an expec-
tation of privacy against the Open Fields Doctrine determined that "no
privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment was
invaded .... ,,169
Illinois courts have afforded inconsistent protection to citizens
under the Open Fields Doctrine. The Illinois Supreme Court in City of
Decatur v. Kushmer, 70 without specifically applying the Open Fields
Doctrine, held that warrantless entry onto an unenclosed yard adjacent
to the appellant's house to view and photograph a potential health haz-
ard which could be viewed from public areas was not a search since
164. See, e.g., People v. Pakula, 89 111. App. 3d 789, 411 N.E.2d 1385 (1980). See notes 175-78
and accompanying text infra.
165. 632 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
166. Id. at 1151.
167. Id at 1156.
168. Id. at 1155 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 1156. Thus the court favored a Katz analysis over one which relied upon the Open
Fields Doctrine.
170. 43 111. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969).
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there was no probing into private places. The court, citing Hester,
noted in dictum that "the fact that the officials may have trespassed by
entering the land would not, of itself, transform their viewing into an
unreasonable search."'
71
Specifically applying the Open Fields Doctrine, the Illinois Appel-
late Court in People v. Lashmett172 held that a warrantless search of
farm equipment located 125 yards from a farm residence, adjacent to a
building but in the open, was not unreasonable under the fourth
amendment, even though a sheriff crossed two fences to search the
equipment. 173 The equipment was not visible from the public road, but
could be seen from the air by persons flying at safe altitudes in the
public air space.'
74
Both Kushmer and Lashmeit seem to hinge upon the fact that the
objects in question could be viewed from public places thereby indicat-
ing no reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the courts applied
the open fields exception to the warrant requirement rather than merely
indicating that there was no reasonable manifestation of privacy. But
in People v. Pakula, 75 the court emphasized the expectation of privacy
principle of Katz and down-played the open fields arguments of both
the state and the defendant. 176 The defendants in Pakula were growing
cannabis plants in their back yard. The yard was enclosed by a chain
link fence but the plants, nevertheless, were visible from a public side-
walk. Police entered the back yard without consent or warrant and
seized the cannabis. The state argued that the Open Fields Doctrine
applied to the back yard. The defendants argued that the back yard
was protected by the fourth amendment since the protection extended
to the curtilage of their residence. 177 The court stated, however:
In our view the determination of the issue presented to us, the legal-
ity of the seizure, should not turn exclusively upon the ancient prop-
erty law concept of curtilage. '[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. [Citations]. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally pro-
tected.' Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d
576, 582, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511.
171. Id at 338-39, 253 N.E.2d at 428.
172. 71 11. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979).
173. Id at 436, 389 N.E.2d at 893.
174. Id at 436-37, 389 N.E.2d at 893.
175. 89 11. App. 3d 789, 411 N.E.2d 1385 (1980).
176. Id
177. Id at 792, 411 N.E.2d at 1388.
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The Pakula back yard was completely enclosed by a fence and
was not accessible to the general public. The officers gained entry to
seize the cannabis by opening and going through the closed gate after
Annette Pakula refused to consent to their warrantless entry. The
Pakula's dog instinctively barked and confronted the police as in-
truders and had to be restrained. The facts of the present case estab-
lish that the defendants expected their back yard to be private and
free from outside intrusion. Under the circumstances we believe this
expectation of privacy was reasonable and one that society is pre-
pared to recognize.
7 s
Similarly, a recent federal district court decision emphasized the
expectation of privacy principle in an environmental search context. In
Dow Chemical v. United States, 179 the court held that the open fields
exception does not apply to the taking of high resolution aerial photo-
graphs of a 2000 acre chemical plant. In Dow Chemical, the plant site
had been constructed so that access to the interior of the facility was
secured by fencing and guards. In addition, the interior of the grounds
were not visible from the roadways outside the facility. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency, having been denied warrant-
less entry to the site, decided to fly over the plant at various altitudes
and take high resolution photographs of the plant. The court held that
Dow's manifestation of privacy was reasonable and that the prying na-
ture of the high resolution photographs,18 0 taken without prior judicial
approval, violated the fourth amendment.'
8 '
From these cases, it would appear that the location of the object of
the search is not the determinative aspect of whether the fourth amend-
ment protection is justified. Rather, the manifestation of an expecta-
tion of privacy and its reasonableness seem to be the key. Therefore,
the Open Fields Doctrine should not be relied upon alone by environ-
mental enforcement agents to provide an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. In the absence of a statute
providing authority for warrantless entry to disposal sites or in the ab-
178. Id. at 793, 411 N.E.2d at 1388-89.
179. 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
180. The court found that the photographs taken at 1,200 feet above the facility, once en-
larged, permitted the viewer to easily discern objects as small as one-half inch in size. Id at 1357.
181. Id at 1358-72. The court, therefore, refused to adhere rigidly to the Open Fields Doc-
trine, preferring instead to read the doctrine together with the privacy principles of Katz. This
court left open the question of whether a mere flyover at an altitude in the public domain, or
whether the taking of regular photographs, would have been violative of the fourth amendment.
In light of the Katz principles and the Illinois court's decision in People v. Lashmett, 71 11. App.
3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979), it would seem that to view objects which could be viewed without
the assistance of high resolution camera lenses would not be violative of the fourth amendment
since it would be likely that no reasonable expectation of privacy had been manifested in such a
circumstance.
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sence of some exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent or
emergency, the agent should attempt to obtain a suitably issued war-
rant prior to entering the premises. However, the foregoing analysis
makes it clear that no warrant will be required where there is no rea-
sonable manifestation of an expectation of privacy.
Abandonment
In Hester v. United States,18 2 the United States Supreme Court re-
ferred to whiskey jugs as "abandoned" in developing the open fields
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 83 The
Court provided no analysis of that term in the case, however. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court has also applied an abandonment concept without
defining abandonment. In People v. BraTfield,184 the court stated that
where "property was discarded by the defendant prior to his arrest," a
warrantless search and seizure of the property did not bar it from being
properly admitted as evidence. 85 In Braffield, police officers saw the
defendant toss a package over his head immediately prior to their
search of it which revealed that the package contained narcotics. How-
ever, the court did not define what constituted abandonment.
The Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Dorney, 86 set out guide-
lines for the determination of whether property is abandoned:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and when
property is abandoned by an individual, that property is no longer
within the zone of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment and
can be searched and seized without a warrant. [Citation].
Whether an abandonment has occurred is a question of fact re-
quiring an examination of the intent and actions of the defendant by
the trier of fact.'
87
In Dorney, the court held that returning to a burned-out trailer periodi-
cally to recover salvageable property did not constitute conduct consis-
tent with a theory of abandonment.
88
Illinois courts have concluded that warrantless searches of trash in
cans or bags deposited at either the curbside or still within the back
yard of the defendant do not violate the fourth amendment since the
act of placing property in refuse containers for removal is consistent
182. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
183. Id at 58.
184. 28 I11. 2d 518, 192 N.E.2d 914 (1963).
185. Id at 520, 192 N.E.2d at 915.
186. 17 I11. App. 3d 785, 308 N.E.2d 646 (1974).
187. Id at 787, 308 N.E.2d at 648 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
188. Id at 788, 308 N.E.2d at 648.
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with the intent to abandon the property. 189 Thus, the abandonment
theory could be utilized in a context involving the dumping of hazard-
ous wastes.°90 It would appear from the courts' decisions that the aban-
donment theory also could legitimately be used in conjunction with an
"open fields" theory where seized wastes were disposed in containers
since the circumstances would indicate that the dumper had no reason-
able expectation of privacy.' 9'
Plain View Doctrine
Where government officials have gained lawful access to property
by a warrant issued under a legislative scheme for administrative in-
spections or under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
discussed above, they may seize property which is reasonably believed
to be evidence of a crime or criminal activity.' 92 The principle that
government officials may seize evidence of criminal activity without a
warrant as long as they are in a place that they may lawfully be is
known as the Plain View Doctrine.
In addition to the requirement that the government officials must
first be in a place that they may lawfully be, the United States Supreme
Court has further stated that the discovery of evidence by way of the
Plain View Doctrine must be truly inadvertent. 93 The Court has
stated:
[Tihe discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent ...
[W]here the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in ad-
vance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it . . . [t]he
requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience
189. See, e.g., People v. Stein, 51 11. App. 3d 421, 366 N.E.2d 629 (1977); People v. Huddle-
ston, 38 I11. App.3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
190. Here it is presumed that the violator is dumping on land which he or she owns or leases
and otherwise demonstrates some expectation of privacy in connection with the property. If this
were not the case, the violator would most likely not have standing to assert a violation of fourth
amendment rights. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
191. Such a theory would be consistent with United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981) (See notes 165-69 supra and accompanying text);
Dow Chemical v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (See notes 179-81 supra and
accompanying text); and People v. Lashmett, 71 Iil. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979) (See notes
172-74 supra and accompanying text).
192. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (Warrantless seizure of evidence in plain
view discovered by police officers while securing an impounded automobile is not violative of the
fourth amendment); People v. Childress, 2 IU. App. 3d 319, 276 N.E.2d 360 (1971) (Validity of
warrant was not at issue since evidence seized was in plain view in a car parked on the street).
193. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Warrantless
seizure of an automobile in plain view to be used as evidence is violative of the fourth amendment
where police had intended for some time to seize the automobile and no other exigencies were
present).
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whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a
legal system that regards warrantless searches as 'per se unreasona-
ble' in the absence of 'exigent circumstances'.'
9 4
Thus, if Illinois environmental enforcement officials have gained
entry to property by some constitutionally acceptable means, they may
seize that which they reasonably believe to be evidence of criminal ac-
tivity without a warrant. For example, where the purpose of the entry
was to carry out routine administrative inspections, and entry was ob-
tained by way of an administrative search warrant, the official may
seize that which is reasonably believed to be evidence of crime. EPA
officials or law enforcement agents trained in the area of hazardous
wastes would be most likely to recognize violations. However, other
law enforcement officials would not necessarily have a reasonable be-
lief that the observed substance constitutes a violation. In the latter
situation, the plain view exception would not be very helpful. How-
ever, where the true purpose of the "inspection" is to search for evi-
dence of criminal activity, the plain view exception is applicable only if
the "inspection" is undertaken by means of a search warrant issued
under the standards of criminal probable cause to search. 95
EVASION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Thus far, this note has concluded that the general rule for searches
of premises when the purpose is to search for evidence of criminal con-
duct is that a warrant based upon the standards of criminal probable
cause is required. 196 However, the existence of the Plain View Doctrine
which permits government agents to seize that which they reasonably
believe to be evidence of criminal activity when the agents are in a
place that they may lawfully be, may allow government agents to seize
evidence of criminal conduct where entry to premises has been gained
by means other than a criminal search warrant. For example, agents of
the Illinois EPA having gained access by means of a warrant issued
under a lower standard of administrative probable cause may seize evi-
dence of criminal activity under the Plain View Doctrine while on the
premises being inspected. Similarly, agents who have gained entry by
way of one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
may also seize that which they reasonably believe to be evidence of a
crime while on the premises.
194. Id at 469-71.
195. Recall the California courts' concern over this form of potential abuse. See notes 105-15
supra and accompanying text.
196. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
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However, there are limitations upon use of the plain view excep-
tion by government agents. The Court stated in Abel v. United
States 197 that "the deliberate use by the Government of an administra-
tive warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case
must meet stern resistance by the courts.' 98 In Donovan v. Dewey,
199
the Court warned that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, com-
mercial property may not be entered for the purpose of searching for
evidence of a crime without a warrant.2°° Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire20 1 stands for the proposition that discovery of evidence under the
Plain View Doctrine must be inadvertent; where the discovery is antici-
pated, a warrant to seize must be obtained.202 Thus, it would appear
that whenever environmental enforcement agents anticipate the possi-
bility of discovering evidence of a crime during an inspection, in order
to use such evidence in a criminal proceeding, they should first obtain a
warrant based upon criminal probable cause unless entry is gained by
way of true consent or some other exception.20 3 However, in the con-
text of environmental enforcement of hazardous waste violations,
meeting the required showing for criminal probable cause to search
may be difficult indeed. Hazardous wastes are frequently not percepti-
ble to the enforcement officer especially where the violator has engaged
in surreptitious dumping or has failed to report to the EPA the true
nature of the wastes being disposed. Therefore, agents may begin to
use inspection warrants or one of the warrant exceptions in order to
gain entry. Once entry is gained, agents could use the Plain View Doc-
trine to seize evidence. 204
If a number of criminal charges are brought in the future against
violators of the provisions of the Act as a result of inspections author-
ized under a lesser standard of probable cause for administrative in-
spections or under some theory justifying warrantless entry, the
potential for claims of sham arises. The courts have suppressed evi-
dence obtained by searches of property where the government's true
motives for the searches as shown by the facts were not supported by
the theories used to gain access.205 Admittedly, one problem in assess-
197. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
198. Id at 226.
199. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
200. Id at 598 n.6.
201. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
202. Id at 469-71.
203. However, the use of consent as an exception may pose special problems for the state as
well. See discussion of the consent exception in the text accompanying notes 125-44 supra.
204. See note 192 supra.
205. See, e.g., People v. James, 44 I!1. App. 3d 300, 358 N.E.2d 88 (1976); People v. Lilly, 38
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ing claims of sham is that of analyzing the subjective motivation of the
enforcement officer. But, nevertheless, upon motions by future crimi-
nal defendants to suppress evidence, Illinois courts will make such an
analysis based upon the facts before them.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to facilitate the investigation of hazardous waste sites sus-
pected of being in violation of the environmental laws, it is recom-
mended that the state's criminal search warrant statute be amended.
Such amendment would conform the statute to Illinois case law which
recognizes that the technical complexity of certain problem areas
makes the traditional standards of specificity for the issuance of a war-
rant impossible to reach.2° 6 A "broader standard" 20 7 to be applied by
judges when issuing pre-indictment search warrants would permit valid
searches under warrant of sites suspected of being in violation of the
environmental laws even though probable cause as measured by tradi-
tional standards has not been shown. Incorporation of the broader
standard into the search warrant statute would strike a reasonable bal-
ance between the public's interest in a healthful environment for pres-
ent and future generations and the individual's right to freedom from
arbitrary interference by government. 20 8
Such an amendment to the state's search warrant statute20 9 might
take the following form:
108-3. Grounds for search warrant
§108-3. Grounds for Search Warrant. (a) Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c), upon the written complaint of any person
under oath or affirmation which states facts sufficient to show prob-
able cause and which particularly describes the place or person or
both, to be searched and the things to be seized, any judge may issue
a search warrant for the seizure of the following:
(1) Any instruments, articles or things which have been used in
the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense
in connection with which the warrant is issued.
Ill. App. 3d 379, 347 N.E.2d 842 (1976) (both cases suppressing evidence found by officers after
stopping autos on theories not supporting their true motives for the stops). See also Haddad, Well-
Delineated Exceptions, Claims afSham, and Foufold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CIUMINOL-
oGY 198 (1977).
206. See cases cited in notes 80-90 supra and accompanying text.
207. See generally People ex rel. Carey v. Covelli, 61 IU. 2d 394, 403, 336 N.E.2d 759, 765
(1975). See also note 81 supra and accompanying text.
208. See People v. Estrada, 68 I11. App. 3d 272, 275, 386 N.E.2d 128, 131, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
968 (1979) ("The reasonableness of searches and seizures depends upon a balance between the
public's interest and the individual's right to freedom from arbitrary interference by law officers."
Id.).
209. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1981). The proposed amendment is shown in italics.
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(2) Any person who has been kidnaped in violation of the laws
of this State, or who has been kidnaped in another jurisdiction and is
now concealed within this State, or any human fetus or human
corpse.
(b) When the things to be seized are the work product of, or
used in the ordinary course of business, and in the possession, cus-
tody, or control of any person known to be engaged in the gathering
or dissemination of news for the print or broadcast media, no judge
may issue a search warrant unless the requirements set forth in sub-
section (a) are satisfied and there is probable cause to believe that:
(1) such person has committed or is committing a criminal of-
fense; or
(2) the things to be seized will be destroyed or removed from
the State if the search warrant is not issued.
(c) Upon presentation of a complaint and affidavitfor the search
of a suspected hazardous waste sitepursuant to Ill Rev. Stal. ch. 111-
1/2, § 1004(d), the issuing judge shall consider that the requisite degree
of particularity varies with the stage of the investigation and the nature
of the material seized Such complaint and affidavit shall not fail to be
sufficiently particular in its descrptions where there is an indefiniteness
in the enumeration of the items to be sought in the search. Where cir-
cumstances indicate that the potentialfor serious danger to the public
safety and the environment exists, descrptions ofgeneral characteristics
shall be sufficient.
In addition, the legislature should consider amending the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act's entry provisions to permit warrantless
entry to disposal sites and other pollution control facilities monitored
by the Illinois EPA. The United States Supreme Court in Donovan v.
Dewey210 recently announced that an appropriately worded statute
could permit warrantless entry to sites and facilities in the interest of
environmental protection.2 1 Frequent unannounced inspections may
be essential in the hazardous waste setting because the very nature of
the threat from hazardous wastes militates against early and easy detec-
tion of violations. Once waste is improperly disposed, the very disas-
ters that the Environmental Protection Act is designed to prevent may
be undetectable for many years and may present an immediate danger
to health and environment or build slowly to dangerous levels. Thus,
frequent unannounced searches would greatly facilitate enforcement.
In order to comport with the standards announced in Donovan v.
Dewey, such a statute must embody the following provisions:
210. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
211. The Court stated that where appropriate, new or emerging industries including ones such
as the nuclear power industry that pose enormous safety and health problems, could be subjected
to warrantless inspections. Id at 606. See also notes 133-44 supra and accompanying text.
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(1) Property must be commercial site, registered for hazardous
waste disposal;
(2) Warrantless inspections must be authorized by legislation;
(3) The statute must provide for regularity of inspections and clar-
ity as to their purpose; and
(4) The statute must indicate that the hazards associated with the
activity are so inherently dangerous that pervasive regulation of the
business is necessary to such an extent that the expectation of privacy
is diminished.
2 12
Therefore, it is recommended that the Environmental Protection Act's
entry provision, Section 1004(d) 21 3 be amended to include the follow-
ing language:
(d) Authorized representatives of the Agency shall make frequent
inspections and investigations of hazardous waste disposal sites regu-
lated by the Agency for the purpose of:
(1) collecting and disseminating such information relating to the
general conditions of such site or facility,
(2) acquiring such technical data and conducting such experi-
ments as may be necessary to further the purpose of the Act,"
(3) ascertaining whether any immediate danger to the public
health, to the employees at the site or to the environment exists,-
(4) determining whether there is compliance with the health and
safety standards of this Act or with prior orders of the Agency.
In carrying out the requirements of this subsection, no advance notice of
inspection need beprovided to anyperson. Nothing herein shall be con-
strued so as to bar notification of anyperson by the Agency. In carry-
ing out the requirements of clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection, the
Agency shall make inspections of each site or facility in their entirety at
least four timesperyear The Agency shall develop guidelines for addi-
tional inspections based upon criteria including, but not limited to, the
hazards found in earlier routine inspections at the sites or facilities and
each site's or facility's experience of past violations of this Act. Such
authority to enter premises regulated by this Act shall exist at all rea-
sonable times.
CONCLUSION
Illinois has begun to take a "get tough" position regarding hazard-
ous waste disposal. With knowledge of the dangers posed to personal
health and the environment by the improper disposal of hazardous
wastes, lawmakers recently increased both the civil and criminal penal-
ties for violations of the state's environmental laws. However, careful
consideration must be given to the use of the criminal system as a de-
terrent and enforcement tool in the environmental context. In order to
212. 452 U.S. at 598-602.
213. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. I11- , § 1004(d) (1981).
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ensure that the heightened constitutional protections offered to citizens
who are brought into the criminal system by the state do not thwart the
goal of the enforcement effort, two changes to the state's laws should be
considered. First, the state's criminal search warrant statute should be
amended to ensure that judges may issue valid warrants where the
specificity of the affidavit's statement of facts and description of prop-
erty to be seized are less than the requisite particularity required in
other contexts. Second, the state's environmental protection law entry
provision should be amended to permit warrantless entry by state EPA
officials. Both changes present themselves at this stage of the new en-
forcement effort as ones which sacrifice little in the way of constitu-
tional protection but which may help to ensure that the ultimate goal of
a healthful environment is met in the safest possible manner.

